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Abstract 
 
 Accountability has become a primary function of large-scale testing in the U.S. 
The pressure on educators to raise scores is vastly greater than it was several decades ago. 
Research has shown that high-stakes testing can generate behavioral responses that 
inflate scores, often severely. I argue that because of these responses, using tests for 
accountability necessitates major changes in the practices of educational measurement. 
The needed changes span the entire testing endeavor. This paper addresses implications 
for design, linking, and validation. It offers suggestions about possible new approaches 
and calls for research evaluating them. 
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 Over the past several decades, accountability has become a primary function—
arguably, the single most important function—of large-scale educational testing in the 
U.S. The transition has been gradual, dating back at least to the minimum-competency 
testing movement of the 1970s, and the nature of the accountability systems and the 
characteristics of the assessments used for this purpose have varied through several 
waves of policy initiatives (Koretz & Hamilton, 2006). Nonetheless, the pressure on 
educators to raise scores has increased markedly from one wave of initiatives to the next. 
The current situation, in which rewards and sanctions for schools based on scores are 
ubiquitous and consequential evaluations of teachers based on students’ scores are in 
place or planned in a large number of states, represents a tremendous change from the 
typical uses of tests 40 years ago. 
 The premise of this paper is that the current uses of tests for accountability require 
major changes to several aspects of educational measurement. The needed changes span 
the full sequence of measurement practices, beginning with test design, continuing with 
the activities needed to maintain testing programs, in particular, linking, and ending with 
validation.  
 In this paper, I focus primarily on instructional responses to test-based 
accountability (TBA), including simple test preparation activities, and their implications 
for the validity of score-based inferences about student achievement. To keep this 
discussion reasonable in length, I will not discuss the evaluation of other effects of TBA, 
although I agree with Haertel (2013) that more extensive evaluation of impact is 
essential. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, I will use the term validity only 
to refer to the extent to which score-based inferences are warranted. I will not discuss 
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implications for further research except insofar as they are directly relevant to the 
changes I discuss, e.g., additional validation. 
Educational Measurement in the Decades After World War II 
 In this paper, I focus only on changes in large-scale testing that have occurred 
since the middle of the last century. For a more comprehensive overview and for  more 
detail about the points summarized here, see Koretz & Hamilton (2006).  
 Much of the large-scale testing in the first decades after World War II was 
relatively low-stakes—that is, scores had limited direct consequences for students and 
schools, and consequently, there was relatively modest pressure to raise scores as an end 
in itself. For example, large-scale commercially produced norm-referenced tests, such as 
the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills, were marketed as a tool for diagnosing students’ strengths 
and weaknesses, and the materials sold with the test still stress that function (e.g., Hoover 
et al., 2003). The shift toward higher-stakes tests began gradually but took a critically 
important turn with the rise of “measurement-driven instruction” and minimum-
competency testing in the 1970s. Successive waves of reform broadened and heightened 
the pressure to raise scores. For example, in the 1990s, many states, such as Kentucky, 
imposed sanctions and financial rewards for schools based on cohort-to-cohort changes in 
test scores. The implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2002 incorporated a 
modification of this system into federal policy, making it mandatory for states accepting 
the largest portion of aid under the act. More recently, many states have shifted the focus 
to sanctions for teachers, implementing score-based evaluations using value-added 
models, student growth percentiles, or other metrics. 
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 For present purposes, the specific sanctions or rewards attached to scores—or 
even the presence of tangible sanctions and rewards—are unimportant. Rather, the issue 
is simply educators (and sometimes students) perceiving substantial pressure to raise 
scores. Indeed, the first empirical study identifying score inflation (Koretz, Linn, Dunbar, 
& Shepard, 1991) was conducted in a district in which teachers perceived strong pressure 
to raise scores but did not face tangible sanctions of the sort that are common today. 
 The development of educational testing during the period of relatively low stakes 
reflected that environment in a number of ways. First, the educational measurement field 
gave relatively little attention to the consequences of testing. Second, the field did not 
focus substantially on behavioral responses to testing, other than administrative behaviors 
and the intended responses of students and teachers. The field gave little attention to 
behavioral responses to testing that might threaten validity, in particular, to instructional 
responses such as inappropriate narrowing of instruction or coaching students to 
capitalize on incidental attributes of items. 
 Warnings that educators’ behavioral responses to testing might undermine the 
validity of inferences about student achievement are nonetheless not new. For example, 
more than 60 years ago, E. F. Lindquist, one of the most  important figures in the early 
development of standardized achievement tests, offered this warning: 
The widespread and continued use of a test  will, in itself, tend to reduce 
the correlation between the test series and the criterion series for the 
population involved. Because of the nature and potency of the rewards and 
penalties associated in actual practice with high and low achievement test 
scores of students, the behavior measured by a widely used test tends in 
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itself to become the real objective of instruction, to the neglect of the 
(different) behavior with which the ultimate objective is concerned 
(Lindquist, 1951, 152-153). 
By “criterion series,” Lindquist meant what we now call the target of inference. Lindquist 
offered this warning in an era of very low stakes. Today, when the well-being of 
educators and sometimes students depends directly on scores, and when increases in 
scores required to avoid sanctions are often large, the incentives to behave as Lindquist 
warned are far stronger. 
 Despite early warnings and the dramatic increase in pressure to respond to testing 
in ways that can undermine validity, most of the practice of educational measurement has 
proceeded without substantial attention to this problem.  
Changes since the 1970s 
 Recent decades have seen an increasing focus on the effects of testing in 
theoretical discussions of validity. The notion that consequences of testing are relevant to 
validity stretches back at least to the middle of the last century (Kane, 2006; Shepard, 
1997). However, this notion became more central to validity theory over the past several 
decades (e.g., Haertel, 2013; Linn, 1997; Messick, 1989; Shepard, 1997). While much of 
this discussion has focused on the effects of testing as important outcomes in their own 
right, some scholars also began to focus on the risk that high-stakes testing might induce 
behavioral responses that bias inferences about achievement. Madaus (1988) and Shepard 
(1988) both warned of the risk that high-stakes testing would generate inflated test scores. 
Linn, Baker, and Dunbar (1991) argued that: 
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considering validity in terms of consequences forces our attention on 
aspects of the assessment process that may not be intended or anticipated 
by the designers of the instruments. We know from experience that results 
from standardized tests can be corrupted [i.e., inflated], and we have clear 
examples of some of the factors that lead to that corruption (p. 17). 
Kane (2006) wrote: 
In a low-stakes context, performance in various subsets of the target 
domain may represent performance in the target domain fairly well. In a 
high-stakes context, standardization to a subset of the target domain may 
lead to instruction and test-preparation activities aimed specifically at the 
test, thus making test performance less representative of performance in 
the target domain as a whole (p. 38). 
Koretz & Hamilton (2006) warned that 
An overarching psychometric issue raised by …[recent] trends in test 
use…is the validity of scores obtained under high-stakes conditions. Test 
scores can become inflated…when teachers or examinees respond to 
testing in certain ways, and these responses are likely to be particularly 
severe when the consequences for scores are substantial (p. 542). 
 The growth of TBA has also spurred empirical research on the effects of high-
stakes testing. This work includes studies of educators’ administrative and instructional 
responses to testing and evaluations of the validity of score-based inferences under high-
stakes conditions. This research has confirmed Lindquist’s prediction that some 
individuals respond to high-stakes testing in ways that inflate scores, and it has shown 
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that in some instances, the resulting bias in inferences about achievement gains has been 
very large. Several illustrative studies are noted below. 
 However, neither the heightened theoretical focus on the effects of testing nor the 
growing empirical evidence of undesirable responses to high-stakes testing has brought 
about substantial changes in the actual practices of measurement. The premise of this 
paper is that current uses of large-scale testing make such changes in practice imperative.  
Research on Behavioral Responses to Testing 
 TBA has a powerful impact on educators’ practices. For example, Hamilton, 
Stecher, & Yuan (2008) noted: 
Studies of relationships between high-stakes testing and classroom 
practices have produced one consistent finding: High-stakes testing 
systems influence what teachers and administrators do. Some of the 
changes would generally be considered beneficial (e.g., providing 
additional instruction to low-performing students; taking steps to align the 
school curriculum across grades), whereas others raise concerns about 
possible negative effects on the breadth and quality of instruction (e.g., 
shifting resources from untested subjects or topics to tested subjects or 
topics; focusing on specific items styles or formats) (p. 3). 
 The focus of this paper is the validity of inferences about students’ achievement, 
and while the documented effects of TBA are diverse, I focus here only on those that bias 
these inferences. Test scores are currently used in many ways, and there may be some 
inferences that are not biased even when the scores of individual students are inflated. 
For example, if inflation were uniform across teachers, it would not bias inferences from 
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normative value-added evaluations of teachers. (Our ongoing research indicates that 
inflation is not uniform and that it varies systematically with characteristics of students 
and schools [e.g., Koretz, Yu, & Braslow, 2013], but that empirical question is beyond 
the point of this paper.) Even if other unbiased inferences exist, they would not moot the 
argument presented here. Few would argue that severe bias in the scores of individual 
students on  large-scale assessments would be acceptable if other score-based inferences 
were not comparably biased. 
 The behavioral responses that create bias in individuals’ scores are primarily 
instructional responses, including explicit test preparation. My colleagues and I have 
suggested a taxonomy of seven types of test preparation that is useful for the discussion 
of test design in the following section (Koretz & Hamilton, 2006; Koretz, McCaffrey, & 
Hamilton, 2001). Advocates of test-based accountability hope for three types of 
responses to TBA: that teachers will allocate more time to instruction, work harder, and 
find more effective ways to teach. All of these are likely (at least to a point) to produce 
meaningful gains in achievement and are not pertinent here. At the other extreme, 
educators may simply cheat, a problem that has recently grown in salience if not 
necessarily in actual prevalence (e.g., Severson, 2011). Cheating obviously undermines 
validity, but one could argue cheating can arise almost regardless of the standard 
practices in measurement, so it is not germane here.  
 More relevant to the present discussion are the final two categories of responses, 
which we labeled reallocation and coaching (Koretz et al., 2001, 2006). Reallocation 
refers to shifting resources to better align instruction with the substantive content of the 
test used for accountability. Reallocation between subjects can arise, for example, when 
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educators increase time spent on tested subjects at the expense of untested ones. 
However, this is not relevant to the present discussion; whether or not it is seen as 
desirable, reallocation between subjects does not bias inferences about achievement from 
scores in tested subjects. In contrast, reallocation within subjects is critically important. It 
arises because tests typically sample sparsely from the target of inference. Within-subject 
reallocation can be desirable, e.g., if teachers to shift resources to portions of the target 
that are more important for the intended inference. However, reallocation can inflate 
scores if teachers shift resources to material that is emphasized by the test (e.g., so-called 
“power standards”) at the expense of material that is untested or de-emphasized in the test 
but is nonetheless important for the intended inference.  
 Note that the key issue is representation of the target of inference, not 
representation of a given set of standards. As discussed below, the target is often broader 
than a particular set of standards.  
 Koretz et al. (2001, 2006) used coaching to refer to test preparation that focuses 
on narrow, specific, often incidental attributes of the test. These specifics may include 
format and other aspects of item style, details of scoring rubrics, and details of content 
that are not substantively important. What these attributes share is that their selection in 
test design is not governed by the target of inference. Test-taking tricks, such as process 
of elimination for multiple-choice items, are also considered coaching. In rare cases—for 
example, if a test confronts students with a format that is so unusual that it could cause a 
downward bias in performance—coaching may be desirable, but in general, it is likely to 
inflate scores or simply waste instructional resources. 
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 Reallocation and coaching inflate scores by different mechanisms. This difference 
has substantial consequences for test design to which I will return below. To clarify this 
difference, it his helpful to conceptualize a test as comprising a composite of 
performance elements (Koretz, McCaffrey, & Hamilton, 2001; see also Koretz & 
Hamilton, 2006). This term subsumes all aspects of the test that influence both 
performance on a test and inferences about it. Many of these elements are substantive, 
i.e., explicitly or implicitly linked to the target of inference. Others are nonsubstantive, 
i.e., they are not determined by the inference but may influence performance. Item format 
is often a nonsubstantive element. An element’s test weight is the sensitivity of the test 
score to performance on that element. The target of inference is also a composite of 
performance elements, and inference weights indicate the importance of these elements to 
the inference. Test and inference weights may not coincide. Because most large-scale 
tests are small, many elements with substantial inference weights will be given zero test 
weights in any given form. Conversely, nonsubstantive performance elements may have 
an appreciable impact on scores despite being of no importance to the inference. While 
these elements are superfluous for representation of the target, they are often necessary 
for construction of a test. What is often not necessary is that they be similar over time. 
 In these terms, reallocation entails shifting resources from substantive elements 
given little or no weight on the test to those with higher test weights. In contrast, 
coaching is primarily a focus on nonsubstantive elements.  
 Inflation from reallocation does not require any bias in the estimated performance 
on individual elements. It generates bias in the creation of a composite—the test score—
because performance on the emphasized elements overstates performance on those 
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unmeasured or de-emphasized and therefore exaggerates mastery of the target as a whole. 
Many examples of the corruption of performance indicators in other fields entail bias in 
creating a composite measure (e.g., Rothstein, 2008). The extensive discussion in 
economics of the principal-agent problem in employment has a similar focus (e.g., 
Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). In this literature, the principal is the owner of the firm, 
and the agents are employees. Ideally, incentives for agents should induce behaviors that 
increase value for the firm, but because most employees have multidimensional roles that 
will be measured only incompletely, incentive systems may induce distortions that run 
counter to the interests of the principal. 
 In contrast, coaching can undermine the validity of inferences about performance 
on individual elements. For example, suppose that a test includes items that use 
Pythagorean triples (integer ratios that conform to the theorem, such as 3:4:5). Suppose 
that test preparation includes a suggestion that students “solve” these problems by 
memorizing the most commonly used triples (as in the case of one test-preparation book 
aimed at the Massachusetts assessments: Rubinstein, 2000). Knowing how to use the 
triples is clearly insufficient to indicate mastery of the Pythagorean theorem, so 
performance on that element would be exaggerated.  
 Research provides ample evidence of reallocation in response to TBA, including 
forms of reallocation that are likely to contribute to score inflation, such as de-
emphasizing or omitting from instruction content that is not tested (e.g., Hamilton, 
Stecher, Marsh, McCombs, Robyn, Russell, Naftel, & Barney, 2007; Koretz, Mitchell, 
Barron, & Keith, 1996; Pedulla, Abrams, Madaus, Russell, Ramos, & Miao, 2003; 
Romberg, Zarinia, & Williams, 1989; Shepard & Dougherty, 1991). Research bearing on 
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coaching is more rudimentary. Few of the relevant studies focused on the nonsubstantive 
details of specific tests that would provide the basis for many coaching strategies, and in 
many studies, coaching is subsumed under a broader category of test preparation. 
Nonetheless, the literature provides clear evidence of coaching. For example, numerous 
studies have found that teachers adapt instruction to mirror the item formats, scoring 
rubrics, or other nonsubstantive aspects of the tests used for accountability (e.g., 
Hamilton et al. 2007; Pedulla et al., 2003; Shepard & Dougherty, 1991; Stecher & 
Mitchell, 1995). 
 Although studies of score inflation are not numerous—relevant data are limited, 
and policymakers usually have no incentive to make such studies feasible—it is 
nonetheless clear that inflation is common and is often very large. Most of the studies 
gauge inflation by evaluating the disparity in score trends between a high-stakes test and 
a lower stakes audit test, often the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). 
The logic of these studies is that because validity requires generalization from the tested 
sample to the domain, it also requires reasonable generalization in score gains from one 
tested sample to another, as long as the tested samples are designed to support similar 
inferences. A number of other factors could cause disparities in trends in scores—for 
example, differences in the alignment of the two tests to the intended curriculum, 
independent of educators’ and students’ responses to testing (e.g., Koretz & Barron, 
1998). While most studies are insufficient to differentiate among these sources of 
divergence, most use audit tests intended to support quite similar inferences, so a 
sufficiently large divergence indicates that score inflation is likely. 
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 The first empirical study of inflation, a cluster-randomized experiment conducted 
in a context that by current standards was quite low-stakes, found that third grade 
mathematics scores were inflated by half an academic year four years after a change in 
testing programs (Koretz, Linn, Dunbar, & Shepard, 1991). Other studies of inflation 
have not been experiments, but most compare performance of either the same students or 
randomly equivalent samples, so they circumvent the primary weakness of evaluations 
using observational data. For example, In the early 1990s, Kentucky implemented a high-
stakes testing program that included sanctions and rewards, using primarily constructed-
response and performance assessment formats. The state legislature mandated that the 
state tests reflect the NAEP frameworks, making NAEP an ideal audit test. Two years 
after the implementation of the program, fourth-grade reading scores had increased by 
roughly three-fourths of a standard deviation on the state test but not at all on NAEP 
(Hambleton, Jaeger, Koretz, Linn, Millman, & Phillips, 1995). After three years, gains in 
fourth-and eighth-grade mathematics scores were roughly four times as large on the 
Kentucky state test as on NAEP (Koretz & Barron, 1998). A number of other studies 
have found similar disparities (e.g., Jacob, 2005; Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 
2000). Studies examining multiple states have shown that disparities in trends between 
high-stakes state tests and NAEP are common, although not ubiquitous (e.g., Fuller, 
Gesicki, Kang, & Wright, 2006; Ho, 2007; Jacob, 2007).  
Implications for Test Design 
 To lessen these problems, we must start with the features of educational tests that 
facilitate inappropriate test preparation and score inflation. The core of the problem is 
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that the sampling from the target used in creating most large-scale assessments is both 
sparse and predictable over time. 
 Holcombe, Jennings, & Koretz (2013) examined the mathematics tests 
administered in several grades in New York and Massachusetts from 2006 to 2008 to 
evaluate the predictability of sampling. They noted that substantive narrowing can arise 
at several stages in the construction of a test: in the specification of the standards, the 
selection and weighting of standards to test, and the selection of content from within 
tested standards. They also observed that test construction requires sampling of 
representations: 
We use the term representation to refer to both unimportant details of 
content and what we term item style. Item style is broader than item 
format, in the usual sense. For example, it includes the type of visual 
representation in the item, if any, the magnitude and complexity of the 
numbers used, and so on. Consider a hypothetical standard stating that 
students should understand the concept of slope in the context of simple 
linear equations. Problems involving slope could be presented verbally, 
graphically, or algebraically, or they could require translation among those 
representations. If the problems are presented graphically, they could be 
presented only with positive slopes in the first quadrant, or with a mix of 
positive, negative, and zero slopes in all four quadrants (p. 172).  
 Holcombe et al. (2013) found predictable sampling substantial at each of these 
stages of narrowing. For example, the proportion of standards tested over three years 
varied markedly, from 58% in the New York eighth-grade test to 90% in the 
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Massachusetts eighth-grade test. These figures understate the importance of systematic 
sampling of standards because some standards are given far more emphasis than others. 
For example, in the Massachusetts tenth grade test, the most highly weighted standard 
consistently contributed 15 percent or more of test points, while the second most highly 
weighted standard over a period of several years contributed 7 to 17 percent in specific 
years. 
 Sampling at finer levels of detail is often less straightforward than sampling at the 
level of standards. For example, in the New York State testing program, one of the two 
most frequently tested eighth-grade mathematics standards was the following: 
8.N.4 Apply percents to: tax, percent increase/decrease, simple interest, 
sale price, commission, interest rates, gratuities. 
One might argue that the wording of the standard in itself narrows the focus of the test, 
but even taking the standard as given, the test items administered further narrowed the 
content. Over the first five years of the testing program, 12 items addressing this standard 
were administered. All but one of the 12 was of one of two forms: 
1. The item provides the base quantity and the percent. The student provides the 
product. 
2. The item provides the base quantity and the percent. The student calculates the 
product and adds it to or subtracts it from the base to get a new total. 
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The single exception was an item that required that students calculate a percent change.1 
Given these predictable forms, it would be easy to develop methods to coach student to 
answer these 11 items mechanically, particularly if one could find key words or phrases 
(such as “total” and “new”) that allow them to differentiate the two classes of items.  
 In extreme cases, the sampling of representations produces items that are near 
clones. An example from Holcombe et al. (2013) is shown in Figure 1. Four items testing 
this standard were administered over the first five years of the testing program. One of 
the additional items was essentially the same as those in Figure 1; the fourth was very 
similar but used longer distractors. One could train students to answer these items by 
simply matching “measure” and “mass” in the stem with “scale” in the answer, without 
teaching them any of the concepts relevant to the intended inference.  
________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
________________ 
 In most cases, of course, items are not as similar as these across years, but they 
often show sufficient similarities to afford opportunities for the types of coaching that 
undermine validity. For example, one of New York’s seventh grade mathematics 
standards before the adoption of the Common Core was “Compare numbers written in 
scientific notation.” During the first four years of the testing program, five items testing 
this standard were administered. Four of the five were similar to the one presented in 
Figure 2. Specifically, all presented four numbers with the same base (10) and asked 
                                                 
1 During the years in question, New York State released all of its test items after a single 
use. They can be retrieved from http://www.nysedregents.org/intermediate.html.  
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students to select the largest number. Once this presentation was expected, it would be 
easy to coach students to answer these items correctly without adequately teaching them 
the skill the items are intended to measure. One would tell them to follow the following 
steps: 
 Pick the numbers with the largest exponent. (The student only needs to know 
which numbers to compare, not that they are exponents or what exponents are.) If 
there is only one number with that exponent, you are done. 
 If there are two numbers with the largest exponent, pick the one with the largest 
coefficient. Again, one need not understand what the coefficient is. 
________________ 
Figure 2 about here 
_________________ 
 In the low-stakes framework that dominated the development of educational 
testing, systematically incomplete sampling had two primary effects, neither of which 
posed a fundamental threat to the validity of score-based inferences. The first effect, 
which arises simply from the fact of sampling rather than its systematic nature, is 
measurement error, which has been a primary focus of psychometrics for generations. 
The second consequence, which does reflect the systematic nature of the sampling, is 
differences in results among tests with similar purposes. Infrequently, these differences 
are large. For example, during the 1970s, Iowa students showed nearly twice as rapid a 
decline in performance on the ITBS as eighth-graders than the same cohorts showed on 
the ITED one grade later (Koretz, 1986, p. 54). Over the past two decades, the upward 
trend in fourth grade mathematics has been considerably faster on the main NAEP than 
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the long-term NAEP and far faster on NAEP than in the U.S. sample of TIMSS. 
However, under low-stakes conditions, differences across tests are usually more modest, 
and they never became a major focus of psychometrics. 
 In the current era of TBA, however, the consequences of this predictable sampling 
are far greater and far more threatening to valid inference. Educators and students have 
strong incentives to focus on the specifics of the tested sample, at the expense of untested 
or de-emphasized portions of the target of inference. To the extent that they do so, the 
relationship between scores and mastery of the target will be corrupted. As the research 
cited above shows, the resulting biases can be very large. 
 For this corruption to occur, two things beyond predictability of sampling are 
needed: educators need to be aware of the predictability, and they need effective 
mechanisms—either reallocation, coaching, or both—to take advantage of them. 
Certainly, many educators do recognize this predictability to some degree, as evidenced 
by the numerous studies of reallocation noted earlier. They learn about it through their 
own experience with tests, through the now ubiquitous and widely encouraged use of old 
test items in instruction, and from test preparation materials, including both commercial 
products and materials frequently provided by state and local education agencies. 
Findings of score inflation indicate that educators have found effective tools for using 
this information. In addition, recent research has found that performance gains are larger 
on items assessing items that had high weights in previous years (Jennings & Bearak, 
2014).  
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Factors Encouraging Predictability 
 Why are tests predictable? In addition to technical reasons, I suggest that there are 
practical ones. The first is cost. It is less expensive and quicker to modify items that have 
performed well in the past, or use them as templates, than to devise totally new items that 
avoid the sampling details of the old ones. A second is that unpredictability in high-stakes 
tests can generate intense protests from educators and parents. (I have been in discussions 
with state officials about the design of new tests in which this concern was prominent.)  
 For present purposes, however, the technical considerations encouraging 
predictability are more relevant, as they are directly in the field’s purview. The technical 
benefits of predictability are primarily matters of error. For example, maintaining 
similarity of items will reduce noise in estimates of change over time, and it will reduce 
the risk of model misfit. Thus, generating similar items has often been an explicit goal of 
measurement experts. One example is the extensive efforts at the Educational Testing 
Service to develop item models that can “generat[e] items that are isomorphic, that is, 
equivalent in content and equivalent psychometrically” (Bejar, Lawless, Morley, Wagner, 
Bennett, & Revuelta, 2003, Abstract [no page number]). As Morley, Bridgeman, & 
Lawless (2004) clarified, these isomorphs share what Holcombe et al. (2013) called 
representations as well as content. A second example is the use of task models by the 
Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium, one of the two multi-state consortia 
developing new assessments to align with the Common Core standards: 
Often in statewide assessment, item writers are given the objectives and 
asked to develop a certain number of items of different types and at 
different DOK [depth of knowledge] levels to address the objectives. In the 
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case of Smarter Balanced, item/task models have been developed for each 
target to assure a greater degree of consistency and replicability of the 
items or tasks addressing a target across developers and across years 
(Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium, 2012, p. 11, emphasis added). 
 The effects of task models on performance have not been well explored 
empirically. One study (Morley et al., 2004) found that performance on “close variants” 
was generally higher than on items with similar content but less similar representations, 
which is consistent with the argument by Holcombe et al. (2013) that similarities in 
representation and details of content may result in score inflation. It is important to note 
that neither the importance nor the complexity of the elements shared among items 
because of a task model is relevant to the argument about inflation posed here. What 
matters is solely predictability that allows students to improve performance on 
administered items more than their performance would improve on items selected 
randomly from the universe of acceptable content and representations. 
 A major change currently underway in large-scale testing that is related to the use 
of task models is a growing emphasis on Evidence-Centered Design (ECD; Mislevy, 
Steinberg, & Almond, 2003). ECD provides a detailed framework for the entire 
assessment process. Most relevant to the present discussion are the first two stages, 
domain analysis and domain modeling. As explained by Misley & Haertel (2006): 
The Domain Analysis layer concerns gathering substantive information 
about the domain to be assessed. If the assessment being designed is to 
measure science inquiry at the middle school level, domain analysis would 
marshal information about the concepts, terminology, representational 
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forms, and ways of interacting that professionals working in the domain use 
and that educators have found useful in instruction (p. 7). 
The domain modeling stage entails determining the test-based behaviors that will be used 
as evidence of claims about students’ mastery of elements of the domain, as well as 
specifying the warrants that indicate why these behaviors are evidence of that mastery. 
 There is as yet no evidence indicating whether the ECD approach will lessen or 
exacerbate the forms of predictability that are problematic under high-stakes conditions. 
It seems likely that this will depend on the nature of the behaviors specified in the 
domain-modeling stage. If the application of ECD focuses on “broad claims” (Herman, 
2013), it may not impede appropriately varied sampling of substantive elements. 
However, focusing ECD on the wording of the specific standards is likely to produce 
undesirable narrowing, which in turn is likely to generate score inflation.  
 While the technical benefits of item similarity have been the focus of extensive 
work, the technical costs of this similarity have received far less attention. These costs are 
primarily matters of bias—scores that are inflated with respect to the target of 
inference—and undesirable effects on instruction rather than error. Thus, the 
consequence of ignoring the problem of predictability in the context of TBA is to 
generate more precise but often badly misleading estimates of achievement. 
Possibilities for Changes in Design 
 The notion of making tests less predictable to lessen score inflation is not entirely 
new, although it does not appear to have led to substantial changes in large-scale 
assessment programs. For example, Hanushek (2009) suggested: 
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Having a large test bank would permit providing each student with a 
random selection of questions, minimizing any chance of cheating. Indeed 
with a large test bank covering the range of relevant material, it would 
even be possible to make questions available beforehand, with the notion 
that “teaching to the test” could actually be considered productive (803). 
 The challenge, however, is determining how much and in what ways items must 
vary in order to lessen the problem of score inflation and then to address the 
psychometric issues that an increase in item heterogeneity will generate. To date, the 
measurement field has devoted little attention to either of these challenges. 
 Three steps are needed to begin addressing the first of these challenges. First, one 
will often need more specific agreement about the target of inference than we generally 
have, because without that it is not feasible to specify the nature and limits of the tasks 
students should be given. Second, to lessen inflation from undesirable reallocation, one 
will need variation over time in the sampling of substantive performance elements, which 
may be what Hanushek meant by “the range of relevant material.” Third, to lessen bias 
from coaching, one will need variation in the sampling of nonsubstantive performance 
elements, including representations, substantively unimportant details of content, and 
nonsubstantive response demands, e.g., substantively unimportant aspects of scoring 
rubrics. 
 Some might argue that agreeing on standards is sufficient specification of at least 
the substantive content of the target of inference, but for several reasons, it is not. First, 
important groups of users of scores may have different intended inferences. For example, 
Porter, McMaken, Hwang, & Yang (2011) found that the alignment between the 
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Common Core standards and the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
is only modest. If policymakers accept the Common Core as limiting the domain from 
which test writers can sample, they will have implicitly deemed content included in the 
NAEP frameworks but excluded from the Common Core as not part of their targets of 
inference. However, it is not clear that stakeholders used to relying on NAEP trend data 
will agree. Second, as noted above, the construction of a test requires sampling from 
within the domain defined by standards, either sampling of standards or sampling of 
content from within standards, as well as assigning weights to these substantive elements.  
 A simple thought experiment shows the risk of mistaking standards for the target 
of inference. Until the acceptance of the Common Core standards, most states had their 
own content standards, and these often differed markedly from state to state. Consider a 
metropolitan area that spans a state border, such as New York City or Washington, D.C. 
Imagine an employer in the Virginia suburbs of Washington who hires entry-level 
employees from Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Would the employer 
expect different mathematical competencies from employees drawn from the three 
jurisdictions because of their differing standards? Clearly not; most employers will 
expect the same competencies of employees regardless of the state in which they were 
educated. For most employers, the most important question is not a specific set of 
standards, but rather students’ ability to use the knowledge approximated by the 
standards in the variety of forms in which the student will later confront it. The adoption 
of shared standards, such as the Common Core, will partially obscure this limitation of 
standards, but it will do nothing to eliminate it. Similarly, the current focus on ‘college 
and career readiness’ is in substantial part rhetorical and is not a substitute for systematic 
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evidence about the targets of stakeholders. Presumably, employers hiring individuals in 
different occupations and college programs of various sorts will have differing 
expectations about what “readiness” means. 
 Some choices about inclusion and weighting reflect explicit decisions of 
policymakers, such as staff of state education agencies or of other organizations 
responsible for testing programs, but others appear to be incidental. For example, the 
Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers (PARCC), one of the 
two major consortia developing assessments aligned with the Common Core standards, 
has divided the standards into three categories reflecting PARCC’s view of their 
importance: Major Clusters, which should constitute the majority of the test, Supporting 
Clusters that will receive less weight, and Additional Clusters that will receive little 
weight (Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers, 2012). In 
contrast, it appears that decisions about test weights are often made without a decision 
about relative importance by policymakers. For example, the core curriculum 
implemented in 2005 by New York State—since replaced by the Common Core 
standards—included the following two eighth-grade algebra standards: 
8.A.12 Apply algebra to determine the measure of angles formed by or 
contained in parallel lines cut by a transversal and by intersecting lines. 
8.A.15 Understand that numerical information can be represented in 
multiple ways: arithmetically, algebraically, and graphically (New York 
State Education Department, 2005). 
The curriculum document did not provide information about the relative importance of 
these standards, but the first was tested six times in the first four years of the testing 
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program, while the second was not tested at all. Similarly, over a five year period, 
approximately 12 percent of the possible raw score points in New York’s eighth-grade 
English Language Arts tests were assigned to items representing this standard: 
Interpret characters, plot, setting, theme, and dialogue using evidence from 
the text. 
In contrast, the items representing the following standard were assigned about two 
percent of possible points: 
Evaluate the validity and accuracy of information, ideas, themes, opinion, 
and experiences in texts to identify multiple levels of meaning. 
Such variations in weights are not unique to New York’s assessments (Jennings & 
Bearak, 2014).  
 To lessen bias from coaching will require close attention to varying many details 
of the test other than substantive content. These may include, for example, substantively 
unimportant details of content, representations, other aspects of item style, and other 
unnecessary regularities in task demands, such as some aspects of scoring rubrics. Test 
preparation focused on any of these aspects of items can improve scores without 
increasing the knowledge or skill the item is intended to represent. 
 These three aspects of item sampling—definition of the target, substantive 
sampling, and nonsubstantive sampling—are often difficult to disentangle, and 
identifying problems with them will often require detailed examination of tests as well as 
standards. For example, standards often specify that students should be able to calculate 
the volumes of simple polyhedra and apply this skill to real-world problems, but it would 
be a mistake to infer from this that various tests assess similar skills. For example, 
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consider two items testing knowledge of the volume of rectangular prisms. Until 2011, 
the Massachusetts standards for 10th grade included this: 
10.M.2. Given the formula [emphasis added], find the lateral area, surface 
area, and volume of prisms, pyramids, spheres, cylinders, and 
cones…(Massachusetts Department of Education, 2000, p. 75). 
As students are given the formula, items testing this standard entail nothing more than 
substitution into the formula and simple arithmetic. However, even if this simplification 
were eliminated, the items assessing this standard are narrowed in important ways. The 
Massachusetts items focusing on rectangular prisms generally refer to an object that is 
completely full, which eliminates the need to use any mathematical knowledge or skills 
other than substitution and arithmetic. In contrast, items about this skill in the Singapore 
Primary School Leaving Examination, taken at the end of the sixth grade, are far less 
narrow; they require students to apply the formula, which is not given, to partially full 
items of different sizes and compare them (Singapore Examinations and Assessment 
Board, 2009). Illustrative Massachusetts and Singapore items are shown in Figure 3.  
 The implications of these differences among items depends on stakeholders’ 
targets of inference. If stakeholders only infer that students can apply the formula to 
completely full rectangular prisms, the Massachusetts items are reasonable. On the other 
hand, if stakeholders infer that success on the item indicates an ability to apply the 
formula to a variety of real-world problems, the Massachusetts standard and items 
represent an unwarranted narrowing with respect to the target. 
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_________________ 
Figure 3 about here 
_________________ 
 Specific options for test design. While calls for sampling from a broad range of 
items are not uncommon (e.g., Hanushek, 2009), I am aware of only two specific 
suggestions in the published literature for how this might be done, one calling for the use 
of two separate tests and the second suggesting embedding less predictable items in the 
test used for accountability. There is as yet almost no empirical work exploring the 
advantages and disadvantages of these (and of as yet unspecified alternative) approaches. 
This is an area in which there is a pressing need for research. 
 Neal (Barlevy & Neal, 2012; Neal, 2013) suggested administering two different 
tests, one to be  used solely for accountability and a second for other purposes, such as 
describing the progress of individual students. Consistent with the argument made here, 
he asserted that the item similarities required for linking and scaling encourage educators 
to respond in ways that inflate scores. He also suggested that to support an effective 
performance incentive system, one needs neither information about change nor putatively 
interval scales, rather only ordinal cross-sectional data and reliable ranking. Therefore, he 
suggested that the test used to provide incentives to educators should incorporate items 
that vary in content and format and should not be scaled or linked. Neal did not specify 
the nature of this variation. A second, low-stakes test would be used to provide 
information about students. This second test would be subject to the usual psychometric 
constraints governing test construction, would have less item variation, and would be 
scaled and linked. Because this test would not be used to hold educators accountable, 
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educators would have weaker incentives to prepare students for it in ways that inflate 
scores. 
 This is an intriguing idea, but it raises numerous issues that the field has yet to 
address. For example, Neal has not yet clarified how the frameworks or targets for the 
two tests would be similar and different. Presumably, they would have to be reasonably 
similar, as few stakeholders would be satisfied with a system in which students are 
evaluated with respect to substantially different material than teachers are expected to 
teach. However, the more similar the two tests are, the less effective separating the two 
would be. Testing time would presumably roughly double, which would be difficult for 
many educators and parents to accept given the already burdensome amount of testing. 
The test designed for students, while intended to be low-stakes, might not in fact remain 
as such because there are mechanisms other than explicit sanctions and rewards that can 
make a test high-stakes. (The first empirical study that identified score inflation [Koretz 
et al., 1991] was conducted in an environment in which there were no explicit sanctions 
and rewards.) Neal’s approach also requires consistent ranking of students, and it is not 
clear how stable rankings would be across the as yet unspecified variations in the tests he 
proposes for accountability. Administering a test that is consequential for teachers but not 
for students also runs the risk of motivational biases affecting the test used for 
accountability. 
 Koretz & Beguin (2010) suggested the alternative approach of embedding novel 
items in a single assessment, which we labeled self-monitoring assessments (SMAs). We 
suggested maintaining current design principles for much of an operational test while 
adding audit components. These audit components would comprise items designed to 
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maintain coverage of important performance elements while undoing predictable patterns 
that encourage inappropriate test preparation and score inflation. Inflation could still 
occur on the conventional items, and discrepancies in performance between the 
operational and audit components would signal likely inflation. SMAs should be able to 
provide estimates of score inflation at the school level, although the reliability of these 
estimates might be too low to apply to individual schools rather than categories of 
schools. While the primary purpose of an SMA is to detect score inflation, the inclusion 
of audit items might reduce the incentives for inappropriate test preparation and hence 
might lessen score inflation. Koretz & Beguin (2010) suggested five specific SMA 
designs that differ in terms of when items are introduced and how linking is done.  
 Although some initial pilot testing suggests that an SMA design can identify some 
score inflation and show variations in inflation across categories of schools, (e.g., Koretz, 
Jennings, Ng, Yu, Braslow, & Langi, 2014), this approach, like Neal’s, is largely untried 
and poses many unresolved issues. It remains unclear, for example, in what ways and to 
what degree audit items should differ from others to function well as audits while 
maintaining fidelity to the target of inference. The addition of audit items would increase 
test length, and constraints on length could lead to short audit components and hence 
unreliable estimates of inflation. Some SMA designs also confront a serious analytical 
limitation. Ideally, one would initially place both audit items and operational items on a 
single scale. This would provide estimates of inflation that are absolute relative to the 
scale. However, this requires that audit items be designed at the outset of a testing 
program, and that is not necessarily entirely feasible. Two or even three iterations of a 
test may be needed before some of the predictable patterns become apparent, and if so, it 
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would be necessary to add additional audit items at that time in order to capture the 
inflation arising from these patterns. However, it is not likely to be practical to place 
these additional audit items on the operational scale because of likely corruption of the 
linking items. In that case, one would be limited to a substantially weaker, difference-in-
differences analytical approach that can only detect variations in inflation (Koretz & 
Begin, 2010).  
 Other alternatives may be feasible. For example, it might be possible to 
implement a variation of Neal’s approach with a single test by modifying a frequently 
used design in which common items are used to score students, while both common and 
matrix-sampled items are used to score schools. In theory, one could exclude the 
common items from scores for schools and teachers and free the matrix items from some 
of the design constraints imposed on the common items. This might require longer testing 
time than current tests, but it would avoid some of the problems inherent in administering 
tests that are consequential for teachers but not students. 
 A likely consequence of making items more diverse would be greater instability 
in the relative performance of individuals and groups. This instability could take several 
forms depending on the design of the testing system, but to my knowledge, there is as yet 
no research directly addressing this question. For example, In Neal’s design, it is possible 
that internal consistency reliability in the accountability test (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha, or 
the person-by-item interaction in a cross-sectional generalizability analysis) might 
decrease compared to a conventional test, but it seems likely that a more substantial 
effect might be an increase in the person-by-occasion (or school-by-occasion) interaction 
across years because the substitution of novel items will likely change the alignment of 
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the test with the implemented curriculum. Designs that provide both operational and audit 
components, such as the Koretz & Beguin proposal, are likely to provide inconsistencies 
in school rankings because of bias as well as measurement error because schools affected 
by larger amounts of inappropriate test preparation would rank lower on the audit 
component (e.g., Ng & Koretz, 2013). Moreover, these differences in rankings are likely 
to be unstable over time.  
 Any substantial increase in instability may cause difficulties for educators, 
policymakers, parents, and students. However, this may be an unavoidable cost of 
reducing the sometimes large bias from score inflation. Moreover, it is important to 
recognize that the decrease in measurement error obtained by not varying items, as in 
current designs, is artifactual, arising from the sampling of knowledge and skills that has 
been made inadequate by the pressures of accountability. 
 A comparison of some issues raised by the Neal and Koretz & Beguin approaches 
is shown in Table 1. 
Implications for Linking 
 Most large-scale testing programs now rely on IRT non-equivalent groups anchor 
test (NEAT) designs to link scales over time. A modest number of secure anchor items 
are included in at least two successive forms, and performance on those items is used to 
link the scale across forms. The nonequivalent groups are the students in the same grade 
in successive years. NEAT linking can be done in numerous ways. For example, one can 
calibrate the two forms separately in the two samples of students and then adjust the 
mean and standard deviation of the item difficulty parameters in the new sample to match 
the old. When the IRT NEAT approach is justified, it has numerous important 
Adapting to accountability  31 
 
 
advantages. For example, it avoids the need for an additional test administration and the 
motivational effects that might bias linking done in the context of a field test. 
 However, a key assumption required for NEAT linking to provide valid 
inferences is not tenable under the high-stakes conditions created by TBA. In NEAT 
linking, the anchor items provide the constraint that allows one to make the scale 
comparable from one year to the next, and they provide the only basis for judging the 
change in achievement in the tested population as a whole. An essential assumption 
underlying this approach is that the relationship between the latent trait and observed 
performance on the linking items is constant, apart from error and scaling artifacts that 
can be removed by the transformation of scale effected by the linking procedure.  
 This assumption is not warranted under high-stakes conditions. If test preparation 
has improved performance on the linking items more than improvement on the latent trait 
warrants—that is, if test preparation has made the items easier than changes in mastery 
alone would—NEAT linking will build score inflation into the scale (Koretz & Barron, 
1998; Koretz, 2007). Keeping linking items secure is not sufficient protection against this 
bias. Linking items may be sufficiently memorable that teachers can focus instruction on 
them directly, anticipating the appearance of similar items in the future. Moreover, it is 
not necessary that specific linking items be remembered by teachers. It is only necessary 
that linking items be sufficiently similar to other items that inflation generalizes 
substantially to the linking items. Given that linking items are typically chosen to be 
representative of the test as a whole (Kolen & Brennan, 2004), this degree of similarity is 
likely. 
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 Standard procedures for evaluating linking items will not reveal this problem. 
Ideally, the relationship between the estimated item difficulty parameters in the two years 
should be approximately linear, and the deviation of the line fitting this plot from the 
identity line is assumed to reflect the artifactual differences in scale that the linking 
process is designed to eliminate. Items that lie far from the equating line are assumed to 
be functioning differently in the two years and are typically dropped from the linking 
(e.g. Kolen & Brennan, 204, p. 187 ff.). However, inflationary bias in linking items will 
displace the line, resulting in an incorrect transformation of scale. The conventional 
procedure of checking for items that fall far from this line will not reveal this bias.  
 When tests are linked with IRT NEAT linking, this bias in the difficulty of linking 
items is the only way in which score inflation can occur in the tested population as a 
whole, because the estimate of change for the population as a whole reflects only these 
items. Therefore, studies of score inflation in assessment programs that used NEAT 
linking (e.g., Klein et al., 2002; Koretz & Barron, 1998) confirm that this bias does arise 
and that it can be very large. 
Possibilities for Changes in Linking 
 The impact of TBA on NEAT linking may be the most difficult of the challenges 
described in this paper. It does not seem that any modest departures from current 
practices in NEAT linking can eliminate this bias. I agree with Brennan (2007), who 
suggested that the data currently used in NEAT linking are not sufficient to resolve this 
problem. I am aware of no efforts to design and evaluate reasonable alternatives. 
 One option might be to complement NEAT linking with common-persons linking 
in a population that was not previously administered the particular high-stakes test in 
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question. However, may be impractical under current conditions. First, the sheer volume 
of current testing makes it unlikely that a reasonable number of schools would agree to 
participate in additional testing to benefit the testing program in another state. Second, 
this would require linking in the context of a zero-stakes or very low-stakes field test. 
This would pose a serious risk of motivational biases, particularly for difficult items, and 
it seems likely that this risk would be exacerbated by students’ experiences with high-
stakes testing. Finally, if, as currently planned, many states adopt common tests, the 
opportunities for this type of linking will be reduced. 
 A second alternative might using linking items that are less vulnerable to bias 
from score inflation, but this would pose serious technical challenges. The first challenge 
is one of design. To function in this manner, linking items would need to differ 
sufficiently from the majority of operational items to be largely unaffected by 
inappropriate test preparation focused on most operational items. At the same time, these 
items could not be too novel, for two reasons. First, linking items should be 
representative of the test as a whole (e.g., Kolen and Brennan, 2004). Second, if items are 
too novel, they may be too salient and therefore too memorable to serve as uncorrupted 
linking items. There is as yet no research indicating whether this approach is feasible. 
 A second barrier to using more novel linking items is analytical. Linking 
functions can vary substantially with the selection of anchor items, even in a traditional 
design in which linking items are not novel (Fitzpatrick, 2008; Michaelides & Haertel, 
2004). Michaelides & Haertel (2004) estimated that linking error from item sampling and 
person sampling contribute roughly comparable amounts of error to individual scores but 
that item sampling is likely to be the primary source of linking error for aggregate scores. 
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It seems likely that using more novel items for linking will increase error from item 
sampling. It is also likely that increasing item novelty will increase the number of items 
that fail to function well as linking items. Finally, in a testing system in which score 
inflation is severe, the use of relatively bias-resistant linking items could result in a 
rapidly growing disparity in difficulty between linking items and conventional 
operational items. This could draw unwanted attention to the linking items and might also 
generate complaints about seemingly inappropriate test construction. 
Implications for Validation 
 Clearly, traditional approaches cannot be relied on to provide a reasonable 
evaluation of the validity of inferences under high-stakes conditions (VIHS). The tests 
that produced the severely biased scores in studies of score inflation had been validated 
by traditional means, but the many of the key inferences based on those scores were 
nonetheless not even approximately correct. 
 There are several reasons why traditional approaches to validation fail to provide 
reasonable information about VIHS. First, the evaluation of content generally considers 
only a single form, not the adequacy of sampling over repeated forms, and relatively little 
attention is given to omissions from the tested sample or undesirable patterns in test 
weights. The empirical evidence adduced in traditional validation is typically collected 
before high stakes have influenced educator and student behavior—that is, before there 
has been an opportunity for score inflation to occur. This evidence is also primarily cross-
sectional and correlational, so it is insensitive to changes in level even if collected 
repeatedly. (For a concrete example of cross-sectional correlations between high-stakes 
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and audit scores that were stable over time in the presence of severe inflation, see Koretz 
& Barron, 1998). 
 Despite the unarguable failure of traditional validation to evaluate VIHS 
adequately, changes in practice have been meager. With very few exceptions, studies of 
score inflation and relevant behavioral responses have been conducted independently of 
the validation programs of the host jurisdictions and their testing contractors. Very few 
states explicitly consider the risk of score inflation in their validation programs, and many 
of the discussions of validity used in training educators or psychometricians make little or 
no mention of VIHS. 
 In contrast to test design and linking, the changes in validation warranted by the 
use of tests for accountability seem relatively clear and feasible, albeit expensive and 
burdensome. The first imperative is to continue validation past the first administration of 
tests used for accountability in order to capture the effects of undesirable responses to 
testing. Second, it is necessary to extend the evaluation of content-based evidence. We 
must evaluate multiple forms over time, considering predictable patterns in test weights, 
including omissions, and we should evaluate nonsubsantive as well as substantive 
performance elements. 
 Third, we need routine evaluation of possible score inflation, which requires a 
greater emphasis on extrapolation. In increasingly common parlance in the measurement 
field, generalizability is used to refer to the consistency of performance across 
exchangeable instances of measurement, while extrapolation refers to consistency 
between the universe score (across those exchangeable instances of measurement) and 
the target of inference (Kane, 2006). Evidence bearing on extrapolation—specifically, the 
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degree of generalizability between a high-stakes test and an audit test—is the primary 
source of data about VIHS. Nonetheless, as Haertel (2013) noted, current validation 
studies do not give much attention to extrapolation. Of course, one impediment to 
assessing extrapolation in evaluating VIHS is that one needs appropriate audit measures. 
 Finally, we need more frequent evaluation of the effects of testing. However, 
I mean this in a restricted sense. Haertel (2013) recently argued that we should evaluate a 
broad range of the effects of testing, including indirect effects, and he noted that the use 
of tests for accountability increases the importance of some of these effects. I entirely 
agree. Research has shown that TBA has powerful effects, and there is an ethical 
obligation to evaluate those effects, particularly as they affect children. However, in this 
paper, I am addressing only the impact of accountability on the validity of inferences, so 
here I am referring only to the effects of testing that have a potentially serious impact on 
VIHS. We need evaluation of behavioral responses to testing, including explicit test 
preparation and other aspects of instruction. This is needed not only for evaluation, but to 
inform the test-design decisions sketched above. 
Discussion 
 I agree with Neal (2013), who argued that “Education researchers need to directly 
address the task of designing assessment systems that make it difficult, if not impossible, 
for educators to form profitable coaching strategies for exams” (p. 17). Validity theorists 
have warned for some time that high-stakes uses of tests are likely to generate threats to 
validity. We now have ample empirical research confirming that this concern is 
warranted, that is, documenting the problems of score inflation and inappropriate test 
preparation. The argument of this paper is that the practices of educational measurement 
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have not been changed sufficiently to address these problems. The purpose of this paper 
is to spur debate about how various aspects of the testing enterprise—test design, linking, 
and validation—should be changed in response to this documented problem, that is, to 
create assessment systems that are less vulnerable to score inflation from inappropriate 
test preparation.  
 Some might argue that I am presenting too harsh a view of the field’s weak 
response to these problems, but I can point to very few efforts to adapt measurement 
practices to address them. Some in the field have made clear and specific suggestions—
for example, Haertel’s suggestions (2013) about validation—but I cannot identify many 
responses in large-scale testing programs. As I noted, I can find only two published 
proposals for design changes specifically tailored to reduce inflation. These are both 
recent, but it still may be telling that to my knowledge, there has been as yet no trial of 
Neal’s proposal (one is being discussed as I write this), and while there have been four 
pilot efforts to test the SMA design principle, I have been responsible for all of them. I 
cannot find any responses to the threats high-stakes uses pose to NEAT linking. 
 The responsibility for this dearth of responses is of course not entirely that of the 
measurement field. Some of the largest impediments to the creation of testing systems 
that are more appropriate for accountability are beyond the control of education 
researchers and measurement experts. First, the stakeholders who commission the 
creation of testing systems have little or no incentive to demand more appropriate testing 
programs. In our current accountability programs, all of the participants in the system, 
from classroom teachers to state superintendents, have the incentive to raise scores as 
much and as quickly as possible. The system provides no incentives to monitor how gains 
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are obtained or to evaluate or lessen score inflation. Second, some of the needed 
improvements are expensive, and the state departments of education that would need to 
fund the improvements are often badly short of funds. These two factors will impede the 
research needed to develop and evaluate approaches more appropriate for test-based 
accountability, as well as the implementation of designs that prove feasible. Third, 
independent studies augmenting conventional validation are hindered by fact that in 
education, in contrast to some other areas of public policy, there is no expectation that 
data should be accessible for research purposes. Researchers proposing potentially 
threatening studies, such as evaluations of possible score inflation, are sometimes denied 
access to data.2  
 Despite these obstacles, however, there are important steps that the field can and 
should take. It is entirely within the purview of the field to set professional standards and 
expectations for validation. We can modify our discussions of validation—our theoretical 
discussions and our proposals for validation of testing programs—to reflect the 
importance of accountability-oriented uses of tests. Such changes could have an 
appreciable if long-term impact. For political and legal reasons as well as a desire for best 
practice, the sponsors of tests often depend on the claim that their testing programs are 
operated consistently with professional standards. If the field makes it clear that the 
design, operation, and validation of tests used for accountability should be tailored to that 
use, then sponsors of testing programs may begin accepting the needed changes. 
                                                 
2 One reviewer asked for specific examples. I choose not to identify particular 
jurisdictions or individuals. However, I have personally experienced this in at least three 
states, in all cases being told explicitly that the reason was the risk of unwanted findings, 
and the same happened to one of my students in a fourth state just last year. 
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 We can also find opportunities to do the needed research and development 
without waiting for states and others sponsors of tests to agree to large-scale changes in 
design, linking, or validation. The two alternative designs discussed above certainly are 
not the only possibilities for new approaches to design, and I emphasized how little we 
still know about the practicality, advantages, and disadvantages of these two. There is 
clearly a need to design and evaluate alternatives. The problem of linking under high-
stakes conditions is a particularly difficult one that could benefit from research. 
 In addition, there are possibilities for research that might afford opportunities to 
improve conventional designs, without turning to changes in design as substantial as 
those proposed by Neal (2013) or Koretz & Beguin (2010). For example, systematic 
evaluation of predictable regularities in test items (similar to that done by Holcombe, et 
al., 2013) and monitoring of test-preparation materials could provide information about 
unneeded and problematic patterns that could be addressed in the preparation of new 
forms of extant tests. 
 Finally, given the current uses of tests, those in the field with responsibility for 
dissemination, such as journal editors, should give appropriate weight to the importance 
of accountability-related issues. 
 While some of the general directions necessitated by accountability are clear, 
many of the specifics are not. Some of the options noted above were suggested primarily 
to spark discussion, and I noted several instances in which we still lack sufficient 
information about the advantages and disadvantages of them. This paper is not an 
argument for a specific approach, but rather an argument that we must recognize the need 
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for fundamental changes and a call for the debate, research, development, and evaluation 
that will make needed improvements feasible.  
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Figures 
 
 
a) Item 27 in 2008 
 
 
Item 9 in 2009 
 
 
Figure 1. Near-clone items from a seventh-grade mathematics test. From Holcombe et al. 
(2013), Figure 7.6, with permission of the authors.
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Figure 2. A seventh-grade item assessing comparison of numbers in scientific notation. 
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a. 10th-grade MCAS (March retest), 2010: formula provided 
 
b. 6th-grade Singapore Primary School Leaving Exam: no formula given 
 
                                                                                     Answer ________________ 
_ 
Figure 3. Items addressing the volume of a rectangular prism, 10th grade Massachusetts 
MCAS and Singapore Primary School Leaving Exam (6th grade). MCAS item retrieved 
from MA Department of Education’s MCAS Question Search (2011).  
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http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/search/ Singapore item from Singapore Examinations and 
Assessment Board (2009).  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. 
Comparison of the current status of the Neal and Koretz & Beguin approaches 
 Neal Koretz & Beguin 
Clear how items should differ Not yet Not yet 
Components1 can be placed on one 
scale No Depends on design 
Increase in testing time Roughly doubled Smaller 
Risk of motivational differences 
between components High Low 
Impact on educators’ behavior Not yet known Not yet known 
School-level estimates of score 
inflation possible No Yes 
Reliability of estimates from audit 
component Not yet clear Low 
 
1 Components are the two tests in the Neal design and the audit and nonaudit components 
in the Koretz & Beguin design. 
 
